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NATO'S USE OF FORCE IN THE BALKANS
JUDITH A. MILLER

I am very pleased to be part of this celebration of Dean Harry
Wellington's extraordinary contributions to both legal scholarship and
to the well-being of two major law schools. My topic isn't directly related to the substantive fields that have benefited from Harry Wellington's contributions, but it is related to his formative influence on me,
when he was my first-term, small group professor at Yale for constitutional law. As I recall it, Dean Wellington decided to teach Constitutional Law because he started thinking about what eventually became
his book on interpreting the Constitution. What was particularly striking and memorable about that class for me was his willingness to invite
us into his classroom as his partners-admittedly very green ones. It
was a model that I tried to follow while I was General Counsel for the
Department of Defense, as we encountered one impossible issue after
another, often arising in contexts where there were no authoritative
sources to consider or much less be bound by. We may not have lived
up entirely to Dean Wellington's collaborative, but rigorously honest
and probing approach-but we tried.
One of the issues* we struggled with was the use of force by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), first in Bosnia, and then
in Kosovo. It is quite possible that the actions taken by the NATO alliance there signaled a fundamental change in both the post World War
II ("WWH") international security paradigm and in the use of force in
our post-cold war environment. In order to address the legal significance of these events, I would like to set the stage for our discussion.
Since the end of WWII, the legal justification for the use of force
to ensure international peace and security has typically started with the
United Nations Charter. Under that Charter, member nations have
committed to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
* I would like particularly to acknowledge CAPT Harvey Dalton, USN (Ret.),
Associate Counsel, Office of the Department of Defense General Counsel, for all of his
assistance and advice on these issues.
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the United Nations.1 Member nations have conferred on the UN Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and have agreed that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.2 The members also have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.3 The
Security Council is the sole entity which is authorized to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, and may make recommendations or decide what measures
4
shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The measures that the Security Council is allowed to take may involve
provisional measures, 5 measures not involving the use of force, 6 and
measures involving the use of force, utilizing forces made available to
7
the Security Council by the member nations.
It is also important to note that Article 51 of the UN Charter articulates the inherent right of all states to individual or collective selfdefense. 8 Moreover, Article 52 of the Charter expressly recognizes the
legitimacy of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with the
maintenance of international peace and security as appropriate for regional action, if they are consistent with the purposes and principles of
the United Nations. 9 On the other hand, the Charter provides that,
except for measures taken in collective self-defense, no enforcement action
may be taken by regional arrangements or agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.
This has been the international security structure for the post
WWII era, and it has worked fairly well, even in the face of the cold war
rivalry between the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact nations. Except
for the instance of the Korean conflict, the Security Council has been
the arbiter of international peace and security; and the nations of the
world have frequently turned to the Security Council to resolve threats
to international peace and security, as well as to settle disputes which
threaten the peace.
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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has
authorized the use of force on several occasions in the recent past.
Operation Desert Storm was launched pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 678,10 which authorized those members cooperating
with the Government of Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to uphold
and implement UNSC Resolution 660 (which had condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate withdrawal of
Iraqi forces) 1 and all subsequent resolutions. Similarly, UN Security
Council Resolution 940 authorized the establishment of a multilateral
force and the use of "all necessary means" to facilitate the departure
from Haiti of the military leadership and the prompt return of the
12
legitimately elected Government of Haiti.
There have been instances, however, when regional organizations
have acted on their own authority to respond to threats to international peace and security without action by the Security Council. For
example, in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Organization of American States acted to impose a quarantine on shipment of missiles to
Cuba, and authorized the use of force to prevent those shipments from
reaching their destination. The organization's action was immediately
reported to the Security Council, but no UNSC resolution authorizing
the action was forthcoming.
Similarly, the use of force in Grenada in 1983 was partially based
on a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a regional security organization composed of Antigua, Montserrat, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada, Dominica, and St.
Kitts/Nevis, which in turn was based on an appeal from the Governor
General of Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon. These states unanimously determined that the conditions on Grenada were a threat to the entire region that required immediate and forceful action, and requested that
the United States, Jamaica and Barbados assist in restoring international peace and security in the region. Thus, there have been two
instances where action involving the use of force by a regional security
organization has been taken without reference to or authorization
from the UN Security Council.
10. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678

(1990).
11. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES!
660 (1990).
12. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994).
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An interesting aspect of both of these actions is that use of force
was authorized and initiated in the absence of an armed attack against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Article
51 of the UN Charter provides that: "Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
"13

There are a number of eminent legal scholars who maintain that
the right of self-defense arises only in the face of an armed attack (and
some who maintain that an armed attack across borders is required),
and that the use of force in self-defense absent the existence of an
armed attack is not legally sustainable. However, if one examines state
practice under Article 51 and the law of self-defense, he or she will
quickly appreciate that the presence of an armed attack is not a prerequisite for the use of force in self-defense. Note that Article 51 provides that "[n]othing in [this] Charter .... impair[s] the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense .... ,,14 This is explicit
recognition that the right of self-defense is not derived from the Charter itself. Article 51 recognizes that the right of self-defense exists independently of the Charter; in fact it exists as a principle of customary
international law established by the practice of nations for centuries.
And, in fact, the earliest articulation of the principle of self-defense
grew out of an instance involving the use of force where there had
been no armed attack against sovereign territory.
During an insurrection in Canada in 1837, Canadian insurgents
found refuge, recruits, and other private support from the United
States, particularly along the border. In late December 1837, about a
thousand armed insurgents were encamped on Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. There was another camp at Black
Rock, on the American side. The Caroline was a small steamer used by
the men on Black Rock and Navy Island to travel between the camps
and other locations.
On the night of December 29, 1837, U.S. citizens were aboard the
vessel in the port of Schlosser, New York when it was boarded at midnight by between seventy and eighty armed men, under the command
of a British officer. They attacked the people on board, set the
steamer on fire, cut her loose, and set her adrift over Niagara Falls.
13.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

14.

Id.
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This generated an outcry in the United States, and led to an exchange
of correspondence between Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his
British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, who avowed responsibility for
the incident as a public act of force, in self-defense. Webster acknowledged the principle of self-defense when he wrote:
The President sees with pleasure that your Lordship
fully admits those great principles of public law, applicable to cases of this kind, which this Government has expressed; and that on your part, as on ours, respect for the
inviolable character of the territory of independent States
is the most essential foundation of civilization.... [Wihile
it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of selfdefense do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in
which the 'necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
' 5
deliberation."
These words by Webster are sacred in the eyes of international
lawyers, and the Caroline is cited as a definitive expression of the customary principle of the right of self-defense, even though nations had
been exercising that right for centuries prior to the establishment of
the United States. However, the context of the case is important because the British authorities acted not in the face of an armed attack,
but in the face of the threat of an armed attack. It is also notable that
Webster articulated what is closer to the domestic right of self-defense
rather than the international principle. In domestic law, the right of
self-defense is an in extremis right, and it has been said that, in order to
justify the use of deadly force, one's "back must be to the wall" before
the defense is justified. Hence Webster's reference to "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" really articulates the domestic concept of self-defense rather
than the international principle that had been practiced for centuries.
The customary international law of self-defense is not that demanding,
and most international legal practitioners agree that use of force in
self-defense does not require that there be a preceding or even simultaneous armed attack.
Although there are eminent legal scholars who would disagree,
most international law practitioners recognize that, in an age of supersonic aircraft armed with supersonic missiles, as well as cruise and intercontinental ballistic missiles, it would be folly to insist that one must
15. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), at http://www.
yale.edu/Iawweb/avalon/diplomacy/br-1842d.htm#veb2.
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absorb the first strike before exercising the right of self-defense. As
aptly put by Secretary of State George Schultz after the 1986 U.S. air
raid on Tripoli and Benghazi: "[T] his nation has consistently affirmed
or
the right of states to use force in exercise of their right of individual
16
collective self-defense. The UN Charter is not a suicide pact."
Most international legal practitioners also agree that the right of
self-defense is an extraordinary right involving four basic elements,
which are derived largely from the Caroline incident: 1) an armed attack, actual or impending which is objectively illegal; 2) the state exercising that right must show a direct and immediate danger; 3) the act
of self-defense must not be excessive, going no further than to avert or
suppress the attack; and 4) it must not be continued after the needs of
defense have been met.
It is also generally recognized that the right of self-defense extends to the right of sovereign states to intervene in the territory of
foreign states in order to protect their nationals, but this right is severely circumscribed by the constraints of the UN Charter. Thus, in
the case of Grenada, the United States, in addition to justifying its actions as collective self-defense in response to the OECS, also relied on
the protection of its nationals as legal grounds for its intervention,
since there were approximately one thousand American citizens living
and studying on the island when chaos ensued.
But what if the situation is not one in which one's nationals are
imperiled? What if the situation is that which existed in Kosovo in
March of 1999? What legal grounds are there for intervening in the
sovereign territory of a foreign nation when the government of a nation is abusing its own citizens? There are a number of legal concepts
which deserve attention and analysis.
First, under pre-Charter customary international law, there was a
right of intervention which made it legally permissible to intervene
"when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution
of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental rights and to
shock the conscience of mankind." 17 Post-Charter law has seen this
right of humanitarian intervention very tightly constrained, although
both the United Kingdom and France employed this legal rationale in
support of Operation Provide Comfort and Operations Southern and
Northern Watch in Southern and Northern Iraq after the Gulf
conflict.
16.

George Schultz, Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, DEP'T ST.

BULL., March 1986, at 15, 17.
17.
LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 137, at 312 (8th ed. 1955); cf LASSA
OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: LAv Ov PEACE § 131, at 442-44 (Robert
Jennings & Arthur Watt eds., 9th ed. 1992).
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The United States has not typically relied on the concept of humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for the use of force, because we
have been concerned that such a concept is a double-edged sword. If
we choose to invoke humanitarian intervention as our legal rationale
for the use of force, what is to prevent other states from invoking that
same concept in support of their uses of force, particularly uses of
force that may not be justified by the facts on the ground? Humanitarian intervention is a slippery slope, because it is quite subjective in
nature; it is not defined; and quite frankly the concept is subject to
abuse by strong states against weak states, so it carries with it quite a lot
of baggage. The United States has consequently been very wary of invoking humanitarian intervention as justification for the use of force.
The impact of the UN Charter is important also, because absent a
UNSC Resolution, the only legal justification it recognizes for the use
of force is individual or collective self-defense. Humanitarian intervention does not neatly fit within the concept of self-defense, particularly
when one is not defending one's own nationals.
In the absence of the humanitarian intervention rationale, what
other legal theories are available with respect to the Kosovo situation?
Keep in mind that we had NATO approving an activate order authorizing the use of force in Kosovo to enforce the requirements of UNSC
Resolution 1199. The UNSC Resolution invoked Chapter VII of the
UN Charter-the Chapter which provides the Security Council the authority to employ the use of force-but the UNSC Resolution did not
expressly authorize the use of force, as did those resolutions dealing
with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government in Haiti. Is invocation of Chapter VII by the UNSC sufficient
to authorize an independent regional security organization to employ
the use of force to enforce the resolution? Are there any other factors
that would add to the case for the use of force without the Security
Council's express authority?
I think that there are a number of factors, the particular combination of which supported NATO's use of force. These factors not only
involve principles of necessity, proportionality and humanity, but also
implicate elements of collective self-defense. Think of the situation in
Kosovo and in the Balkans in March, 1999.
First, there was plainly a threat to peace and security in the region.
In the Kosovo situation, we had an armed conflict, which had generated thousands of refugees. These refugees had spilled over into
neighboring provinces and countries, and had themselves contributed
to instability in those countries. The fighting in Kosovo had also generated armed clashes across the Albanian border, and threatened to
engulf NATO allies Greece and Turkey in the regional conflict. Even
though there did not appear to be a threat of imminent armed attack
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against NATO allies, there was a very real possibility that the entire
area could erupt into armed conflict, and that armed conflict could
involve NATO allies. Moreover, this threat to peace and security in the
region had been recognized by the UNSC. In Resolution 1199, the
Council invoked its authority under Chapter VII of the Charter, and
expressly affirmed that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo
constituted a threat to peace and security. 18
Second, NATO itself has a unique role in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("FRY'). With the repeated approval of the UNSC, NATO
has assumed special responsibilities in the FRY. Moreover, the presence of our forces in Bosnia gave us a special stake in threats to peace
in the region.
Third, the contemplated action in Kosovo resulted from multilateral, not unilateral, decisions. And these decisions were made by an
organization-NATO-which has played a unique and historic role in
maintaining peace in Europe.
Fourth, there was an imminent threat of a humanitarian catastrophe. As the Secretary-General had reported, the lives of hundreds of
thousands of civilians in Kosovo had been placed at risk by actions of
the FRY. While the United States has historically, and properly, been
leery of the concept of "humanitarian intervention" as a basis for the
use of force, the humanitarian threat in Kosovo was real, and was certainly one factor to be taken into account in evaluating the possible use
of force.
Fifth, also recall that at the time NATO was deciding whether or
not to take military action, diplomatic and political efforts to resolve
the crisis in Kosovo and the threat to regional neighbors had been
unavailing, largely because of the intransigence of the president of the
FRY, although the insistence of the Albanian Kosovar leadership on
total independence had contributed to the situation. Thus, there appeared to be no reasonable alternative to the use of force in order to
avoid the direct and immediate threat of hostilities to regional peace
and security.
Finally, all these factors coalesced in the Balkans, an area with a
unique and violent history, and a region that has frequently been a
tinderbox, sparking broader conflicts.
All of these factors combined presented a clearly threatening situation in Kosovo. The point is not that any one of these factors, in
isolation, would have been sufficient tojustify the use of force. Rather,
the unique combination of these factors provided, in my view, and in
18. Security Council Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3930th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998).
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the view of the U.S. interagency legal community, a persuasive argument in support of the use of force by NATO.
Of course, part of the equation in this instance was the fact that
NATO had no other hidden agenda for Kosovo, that is, it was not seeking to occupy territory, promote any particular ideology or obtain resources; neither would it stay longer than necessary to restore and
maintain peace and security. Furthermore, the proposed military operation was directed solely at military and paramilitary targets, designed to defeat the FRY's ability to threaten peace and security in the
region and to restart the diplomatic and political processes, which
would lead to a resolution of the crisis. The operation was to be limited, focused, and directed only at legitimate military and paramilitary
targets. It was not designed to punish or seek revenge against the FRY
and its President; it was designed instead to terminate the unlawful
attacks against the civilian population of Kosovo, to deter any future
attacks, and to bring the FRY to the negotiating table to resolve a situation which posed a direct and immediate threat to NATO in the
region.
The NATO action in respect to the situation in Kosovo, however,
is truly an extraordinary event, even more so when one examines the
nature and purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO was, after
all, established for the purpose of confronting a massive threat of invasion and occupation posed by the Soviet Union and its allies following
WWII. The North Atlantic Treaty reaffirmed the faith of its members
in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and in the rule of
law. The parties committed to maintaining their individual and collective capacities to resist armed attack, and agreed that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America would be
considered an attack against them all. They agreed to assist the party
or parties attacked, by taking such action as they deemed necessary,
including the use of force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area. The alliance has always been essentially defensive
in nature.
Therefore, it is in some ways quite unusual to have NATO as an
organization using force in a situation such as Kosovo, and doing so in
the absence of an express authorization from the UN Security Council.
On the other hand, given the extent of the conditions in the
Balkans, it is not at all extraordinary that NATO could, and would, take
this action. That brings me to my final point on NATO, which is simply to note that before Bosnia, NATO had never really undertaken a
real world military operation, with all that implies operationally in
terms of command and control, Rules of Engagement, interoperability, National Atlantic Council decision-making, et cetera. I think
we can all, on reflection, recognize how much NATO and the intema-

100
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tional security landscape have changed since the initiation of action in
Bosnia and the use of force in Kosovo.
The burning question is whether these events have signaled a fundamental change in the post-WWII international security paradigm
and its legal underpinnings? Can we expect NATO to continue to operate "out of its box" so to speak, and if so, what does this portend for
other regional security organizations? Is the international community
willing to accept the use of force, for example, by the Arab League or
the Organization for African Unity under circumstances similar to Kosovo? We might prefer that they do so, in view of the wholesale carnage in Rwanda and Burundi caused by internal armed conflicts. On
the other hand, it is easy to see the "slippery slope" aspects to the Kosovo situation, and the distinct possibility that the precedent set by
NATO may be employed by other regional organizations as ajustification for more aggressive conduct.

